

Hi Romana

Think of the streets that you go along to get from your house to uni. Say you're having coffee with a friend and you invite them over to your place, and you pull out an old envelope and draw a little street map of how they get from uni to your place on their bike. Now say there's a taxi driver who has to come to a call at your place, and gets out the Melway to see where you live. Now imagine a third map, held at the Board of Works, which shows where all the sewers and storm-water drains run in relation to those same streets. And a fourth, at the road-repair company showing in detail where all the pot-holes and cracked gutters are. Four maps. Which is the truth?

The absolutist wants to say that all four are aspects of the one truth, the map of all maps which includes all information from all possible maps. But how can we define "all information"? Is the location of every grain of sand on the map? Every fallen leaf? Each and every possible detail? And what about the information concerning how things are moving and changing? If you think about it, you see that the only absolute map of a region of actual reality is that very reality itself, and that's no map at all.

In reaction, the thoughtless relativist declares that there is thus no such thing as truth at all. This is failing to see two things. Certainly there are infinitely many representations of one sort or another that could count as a map of a given region of reality, but that does not mean that just any old arbitrarily drawn scribble can count as a map.

So the relativist says there is no truth; whereas the absolutist that there is ultimately exactly one truth (the way things actually are). The perspectivist in contrast says there is always more than one truth. Each of the four maps is true from a perspective - i.e. true according to one set of evaluations concerning things like relevance, worth, aims, and purposes, scale - and yes, each is the truth from that perspective. But the fact that there are other true maps different from yours is not a problem. The main thing is to have the right map - the right truth - for your situation given who you are and what you want to do. If you're trying to study the micro-habitats of marine creatures, a tiny-scale map of one meter of coastline might be just what you need, and a large-scale one of kilometers of the coast-line round about might be useless. But if you're out at sea looking for a safe place to land your boat, the reverse would be the situation. And furthermore, we need to keep a grip on a critical ability to evaluate and rank maps, and to incorporate smaller maps into each other to make larger and more accurate maps.

So which truth is THE truth depends upon your perspective. This does not mean truth is arbitrary, but it does mean it is contingent, because the thing about perspectives is that they can and do change. Contingencies are connected and truths encompass one another like Russian dolls. Being able to entertain several perspectives simultaneously is crucial to Nietzsche's approach to truth which I shall call differential. Being able to jump from one perspective to another in order to see how truths change is analogous to being able to move your head around to see if an object in your visual field is actually the three-dimensional solid entity it appears to be, or is actually a very well-painted 2-D cardboard cut-out, or some other optical illusion. To be able to differentiate and to integrate contrasting and even conflicting truths is something we all do all the time without thinking about it, and Nietzsche for one thinks we can and should think about it. And if we do, we see that perspectives can be ranked according to depth, breadth and clarity, although never absolutely, for each ranking also depends upon perspective.

First some methodological comments on your thesis project. You need to get perspective on Nietzsche's works as a whole:

Birth of Tragedy (1872)
Untimely Meditations I-IV (1873-6)

aphoristic phase:
Human All-Too-Human I-III (1878-80)
Dawn (1881)
Gay Science (1882)

Zarathustra I-IV (1883-5)

programmatic phase:
Beyond Good & Evil (1886)
Genealogy of Morals (1887)
the 1888 works: Twilight of the Idols
Antichrist
Nietzsche vs. Wagner + The Case of Wagner
Ecce Homo

Notice that there is no book called *Will to Power* in this list. That collection was cobbled together by his uncomprehending sister after her anti-semitic proto-facist husband had committed suicide in their colony (called New Germany) in central Paraguay, and her brother had gone mad at roughly the same time. Her weird story is in Ben Macintyre's book *Forgotten Fatherland* and in H.F. Peters' *Zarathustra's Sister*. It is important, because Nietzsche broke with her when she got engaged to Bernhard Förster, who tried to use his connection to Nietzsche's sister to wheedle his boorish way into Wagner's good graces. Elizabeth herself had tried to exploit her brother's cultural capital to social-climb with the Bayreuth crowd, as she herself had no education to speak of and no fortune.

This is all relevant because she became literary executrix of Nietzsche's writings after their mother died in 1894. Nietzsche himself had succumbed to his brain-tumor between Xmas and New-Year's 1888-89, and was totally non-compis, and Elizabeth seized on Nietzsche's work as a source of money. She cobbled together what is now called *Will to Power* out of his notebooks. All the chapter headings are hers; the arrangement into chapters is hers; material is cut out that she didn't like and notes falsified that were unacceptable to her anti-semitic frame of mind. You only have to look at BGE #251 to see Nietzsche's mature stance on Wagner and his nasty racist world, but if you want to follow up this question Y. Yovel's *Dark Secret* is the place to start.

So you see *Will to Power* needs to be approached carefully, and cannot simply be held next *Birth of Tragedy* and compared. It is material Nietzsche chose not to publish - much of it first drafts of passages which appear somewhat altered in BGE, and the published version must be given precedence to be fair to Nietzsche. This is why there's now a new de-Elizabethized edition of this unpublished material edited by Rüdiger Bittner called *Writings From the Late Notebooks*. They together with the first of the new Stanford Uni collected Nietzsche edition tr. & ed Richard T. Gray entitled *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations* and Daniel Breazeale's selection from the early notebooks form the three volumes in English translation available from the 7 volumes of

unpublished notebooks in the KSA (Colli and Montinari vols 7 - 13). Although there's lots of gold in there, it has to be used in parallel with and not instead of the published works they shadow. As do a third voluminous archive of letters, some of which are translated in various odd volumes.

Nietzsche is not only a perspectivist, he's also a philosopher of becoming, as he called it. Meaning he is not seeking the essential truth about Being - he thinks there are no eternal essences; although this does not rule out local temporary essences, in the same way that perspectivism doesn't rule out local, temporary, small "a" absolute truths. From our everyday perspective, the mountains really are unchanging. But from the geologist's perspective, whole continents come and go. The mountain is both changing and not changing depending upon your perspective, and it's the flexibility of perspectivism that both changing and unchanging can be true at the same time from our third perspective. For the perspectivist, local evaluation always remains crucial, as is being able to see the difference between locally absolute and locally contingent facts. And "facts" for Nietzsche means not so much what things "are," (which cannot be absolutely defined), as how they are changing. Likewise we need to think of ourselves in terms of our changes, rather than our "substance". (This is also why he's not a materialist, but I'll get back to this). How we are changing is more important for Nietzsche than what we are. This is less counter-intuitive than it might at first seem. For example, if a bullet is entering your chest, you don't really care if it is lead, gold, plastic or stone. All that matters to you is how this heavy little object is changing (moving very fast) and how that will make your skin, bones, organs and arteries change (for the worse). But to generalize this thought to include our understanding of ourselves is not so intuitive.

Nietzsche's triple body of work (published // unpublished // letters) is also three evolving streams running in parallel. With the *Birth of Tragedy* you have hold of the start of one of these three strands, and so it has to be remembered that his thoughts on the published side evolve *from* that point. But with the *Will to Power*; you have a (somewhat muddled) picture of the *end* point of another of these strands. To hold the two books side by side and look for Nietzsche's "position" is too hasty.

So if you want to draw on both published and unpublished works, you need on the one hand, to situate the *Birth of Tragedy* in terms of Nietzsche project in 1872; and on the other, to see the developments that led Nietzsche to end up thinking to himself about art and truth in the way that he does in 1887-8, and compare it to what he said in published print at that time (especially BGE but also TI), and also maybe to the unpublished notebooks of 1872.

Nietzsche went to a famous grammar school called Schul-Pforta and learnt his Greek and Latin from the classics in the traditional way in the 19th century - a distant and sanitized and somewhat condescending approach to the ancient Greeks from a Christian perspective. On the other hand he loved poetry and discovered both Goethe and Höderlin in his youth. Then as a university student in philology in Leipzig he discovered Schopenhauer in a second-hand bookshop, devoured him in a week, and was completely won over. Here was philosophy not as an abstract discipline about some long-dead people, but the living, breathing, vital thinking about his life. Although not himself exactly an existentialist, Schopenhauer triggered Nietzsche's existentialism by reminding him that philosophy is about your life, not someone else's. And more importantly about our culture (for him, the culture of Weimar Germany; for us, the world of the 21st century). Chapter 3 of Peter Bergmann's *Nietzsche, the last Antipolitical German* is really good on this phase of Nietzsche life and thought.

The whole phase - and this includes the Untimely Meditations, especially the third and fourth ones - was characterized by the desire for a "new renaissance" in Germany driven like the Italian one of the 1400s by a new-found appreciations of the classics and the profundity of our heritage from Greek

and Roman literature if only we had the brains to understand and interpret it. But this Nietzsche realized had to be spontaneous and not contrived, not a slavish resurrection of Greek plays but a genuine creation of a whole new art form, as the invention of tragedy and in fact theater itself in ancient Greece circa 500 BC. This as the title says occurred "out of the spirit of music", and by studying this birth Nietzsche hopes to become the philosophical midwife to Wagner's delivery of the *modus operandi* of the new art form - Wagner's epic operatic drama bringing the pagan mythology of Old Norse back to life.

So Nietzsche around the age of 24 is mixing Goethe-inspired romanticism and holism with Schopenhauer-inspired Wagnerianism.

re Goethe see Phillip Grundlehner, *The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche*
and also look up Goethe in the index to Grays ed of the *Unpublished Writings*

re Schopenhauer, along with Bergmann's book, see the conclusion to Roger Hollingrake's *Nietzsche, Wagner and the Philosophy of Pessimism* (this book's about Zarathustra wrt Parsifal, so beyond your scope, but the concl goes back to BoT.)

also: Silk & Stern *Nietzsche on Tragedy*

J. Young *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*

M. Rampley *Nietzsche, Aesthetics, Modernity* (chs 3&4)

In contrast to the dry scholasticism of the sanitized classics he was taught at Schulpforta, his encounter with Schopenhauer was fully existential and not at all abstract but a very concrete experience concerning his own life and way of thought. This is the atmosphere of BoT and UM; dreaming of a new renaissance in Germany - a period of intense cultural creativity catalyzed by a renewed and deepened encounter with the significance and meaning of classical culture and literature, as it had been in Italy ca 1400.

This was Nietzsche's frame of mind when Sophie Ritschl introduced him to Wagner in the autumn of 1868. Nietzsche is 24, and suddenly here it is - the real thing. A cultural revolution revolving around a new art form, Wagner's epic opera-theatre. A great composer married to the daughter of a great composer (Cosima Wagner was Franz Liszt's child), constructing his own kind of temple at Bayreuth, inventing a whole new epic art form as the vehicle for the vision. Nietzsche was for a year or two completely caught up in the feeling of momentous potential.

Even by the second Bayreuth Festival, Nietzsche was becoming nauseated by the place, and the vision soured completely when he sensed the incipient antisemitism and Christianizing tendencies of the Bayreuth crowd. That's one of the things that *BoT* is 'becoming' - i.e. becoming disillusioned with Wagnerianism - but its not quite there yet, and obviously it remains a hymn of praise to Wagner. The other thing *BoT* is becoming is disillusioned with Schopenhauer (see e.g. HatH II §271), but again, he remains largely faithful to his hero in that work. Read *World as Will and Representation* §18 and you'll see why you want to call him a materialist. And you're not alone - see Peter Sloterdijk's little book, *Thinker on Stage: Nietzsche's Materialism* - takes this tack. I think this is to underestimate the complexity of *BoT*. The truth is that less materialistic is another thing *Birth of Tragedy* is becoming, and I'll get back to that. But to note in passing: Schopenhauer although far more the materialist than either Kant or Plato (his two avowed predecessors), is in the end still another kind of idealist: ""representation as motive is not a necessary and essential condition of the will's activity" - that's from §23 on p114 of vol. I. This is Schopenhauer's big disagreement with Hegel, who identified Spirit with revelation and maintained that its essence was to reveal itself. For Schopenhauer Will remains always

partially implicit and is never able to make itself fully explicit. Thus art (and especially music) has a crucial role in giving us access to those dimensions of the Will which cannot be made explicit in representation.

This ties in well with the romantic proclivities which Goethe, Schiller, Klopstock, Novalis and the Schlegel bros bequeathed the young poetic Nietzsche, and even to some extent Rousseau. But it is not an original state of nature to which Nietzsche yearned to return. (See Gilman Blair and Parent eds. *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language* and see also Philip Grundlehner ed. *The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche*). He is not so naive as to dream of returning to anything, but rather only of transforming the future and its sense of responsibility towards the future through a clear-sighted view of the past. This is why Nietzsche returns to the original renaissance, so to speak; to the birth of the theater in ancient Greece - the primal scene of the art form of theater itself. If you keep in mind that the actors in Greek theater wore masks on stage, and that the Greek word for mask is *karakter*, and that in the play the voice (*sona*) of the god came through (*per*) the mask, you will have some feel for the reason why the staging of the relationships between *karakter*, *persona* and *dialog* might specifically interest him.

Here's how the evolution of the theater happened: an ancient religious ritual supposed to have been instituted by Theseus upon his return from Crete after having slain the Minotaur with Ariadne's help then dumping her at Naxos for which hubris he paid the price of his father's inadvertent suicide. This ritual is in worship of the god Dionysus called the Dionysia, occurring at the time of the grape harvest. It involves actors wearing masks of Dionysus and Ariadne leading the women of each village into the woods to the *orchestra* (or sacred dancing circle) where the *orchia* would be performed. Compare Dodd's introduction to his translation of Euripide's *Bacchae* from 1944 to Kirks introduction to his translation of that same play to get a sense of the breadth of interpretations, and with Rudolph Otto's *Dionysus Myth and Cult* and also Marcel Detienne's *Dionysus Slain* and *Dionysus Reborn*. Fraser's *Golden Bough* chapters XLIII and XLIX are still worth a look too.

Around 600 BC a *theatron* or viewing-space was added to the side of the *orchestra*, and theater as we know it is born. In an interesting book called *Dionysus Writes*, Jennifer Wise ties this development in with the literacy revolution underway in Greece 800-500 BC, as the concept of a scripted play comes into existence, precursor to the philosophical dialogue in Plato. By 540 BC the Dionysia has become a traditional festival, with a competition for the best play. First winner is one Thespis, and actors have been called thespians ever since. By the time of Plato there are literally thousands of tragedies in existence, but only a few have survived (and not at all necessarily the best ones).

As you know in the *BoT* Nietzsche is attacking the sanitized view of ancient Greece as the triumph of the Apollinian prevalent amongst classicists in the 19th century - the triumph of rationality over barbarism. In championing the Dionysian he is trying to correct the one-eyed view he had been taught and was expected to teach, which saw only those aspects of Greece Christianity wanted seen. He is trying to rub the noses of the puritans and pietists in the noses of the actual facts of Greek culture, and saying that as long as we ignore what Dionysus means to them, we don't understand them or more importantly what they can be for us and do for us.

This brings us to your questions about metaphysics. It's worth noting that *meta* in Greek means beside or next to, and the Christian interpretation of meta-physics as super-nature (i.e. of metaphysics as the account of supernatural things) is not at all necessarily the right interpretation of what was going on in ancient Greece. It's true, the Christian interpretation is basically the same as Plato's interpretation, but on Nietzsche's reading Plato begins a decadent phase of Greek culture, which had flourished with Heraclitus, Parmenides and the oldest Attic tragedians. At this pre-Platonic point, the "other world" and "this world" were not divorced, and mythos and logos, while still distinct, were intertwined in a way which is expressed symbolically in the Dionysus/Apollo dichotomy.

At this point Nietzsche has not yet articulated his perspectivism - that stems from an important little unpublished essay he wrote in 1873 called "On truth and lies in a non-moral sense" in Daniel Breazeale ed. *Philosophy and Truth: selections from Nietzsche's notebooks of the early 1870's* among other places. At this stage he still maintains a romantic conception of a true self distorted by social and ideological pressures: "Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being" he says in UM IV (Schopenhauer as Educator) p. 143, and in UM III calls for two hundred youths to start the new renaissance with him.

I said in *BoT* Nietzsche is becoming a perspectivist, and one sense in which this is so is that Dionysus and Apollo are contrasting perspectives upon creativity itself, they being the dual deities of art. So I agree with you that it's a mistake to associate Apollo with appearance and Dionysus with reality. This is a metaphysical confusion. Both Apollo and Dionysus have their own modes of appearance (*parousia*) and sharing the temple at Delphi symbolizes their agonistic interdependence. Schopenhauer's will cannot appear explicitly and must express itself in the language of music, and can only be felt, not known. Apollo gives expression to one truth of the will, Dionysus another, and although he doesn't say this, presumably the other ten Olympians express perspectives of their own.

Given the Schopenhauerian thought that the highest part of ourselves cannot speak but can only express itself indirectly through art, music is the language of the will because it is a balance of the explicit - the lyric, the language, the meaning, Apollo with his lyre - and the implicit - the melodies, harmonies, rhythms, whose meaning cannot be reduced to language but can only be felt directly and immediately as an intensification of the quality of experience. It is only the two together which allow the theatrical experience - the birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music. Neither is "the truth" *simpliciter* but only a truth for itself in its differentiation from its other. Thus Apollo and Dionysus need each other in order to appear, and the inevitable undermining of the one by the other and the other by the one is the sense of the tragic, the sense of the necessity of sacrifice (archaic Dionysia always involve sacrifice of at least a goat but in earlier times a human). A series of linked double-binds define the tragic situation. Life and death can only appear together in their contrast; the gods can only appear on stage *as if* they exist; structure is sterile unless contaminated by chaos; appearance and reality can only appear together in their contrast. This metaphysical truth cannot be expressed any more explicitly than by gesturing towards it.

So yes both Apollo and Dionysus are appearances of what Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in calling the will, which in and of itself can only show itself as the body, but remains for Schopenhauer noumenal. This Greek word Kant gives an important role: it means apprehensible only by *nous*, in contrast to phenomenal, apprehensible only by the senses (from the root *phos* - light). Kant's theory

(transcendental idealism) says we can only access noumena *formally* - we can deduce aspects of its form by what it makes possible (i.e. the phenomena we experience), but that we cannot make this insight into an explicit sensual experience. But both Hegel and Schopenhauer disagree with Kant and say that we can and do have a kind of "intellectual intuition" which is different to empirical intuition of phenomena, but more than merely "thinking about" noumenal reality in a purely formal / logical / mathematical / geometrical sort of way. For Hegel, we intuit the Spirit directly when we develop sufficient self-consciousness to understand representation as a concept and not just an experience; for Schopenhauer, we intuit the Will not through gain but through loss, and through failure and limitation, and, true to Kant, the realization that the Will cannot be represented (whereas Hegel defines revelation as the very essence of the Spirit). But Schopenhauer parts from Kant by saying this is what art is for - to access the non-representable. For Kant, art was all about feeling the balanced attunement of the faculties, and the art gallery a kind of tune-up garage for the mind. For Hegel, it is Spirit trying to tell us something about ourselves (i.e. that we are it); and for Schopenhauer, it is the consolation for the fact that we basically neither know what we are, nor have any control over it: "absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving." [W.asW.&R. §29, vol I p.164]. So what is it? "The sole self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the representation as a whole, the whole world of perception." [p.165]

This is an interesting twist on Kant. For him, all we could deduce about the noumenal world was its unity - and a formal unity at that. The transcendental unity of apperception is a purely formal unity and not an actual experience for Kant. Transcendental - that means having the formal appearance of transcendence, not the offer of an actual experience - unity of owned-perceptions: that the owner of my perceptions is a unity: that's the end of the line for knowledge for Kant, and from thereon in freedom kicks in, and its over to action in the second Critique, which is the domain not of knowledge but of faith as Kant defines it. But Schopenhauer is not satisfied: its not that reality is a unity - as if we could prove that - but that it always appears as a whole - that we are always situating ourselves as wholes in a whole. And this is exactly what art does - lets us see the whole, or rather hear, as it is music which he thinks is the highest art - see esp §52 - but it is tragic because "in the whole irrational world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, being has a really connected consciousness that would make its life into a significant whole." [p.259] The idea hovers on the edge of our grip long enough to give us an intuition of the whole, but always slips between the lines of representation and we are left prosaic and dumb. Life's a bitch and then you die: that's Schopenhauer in a nutshell.

Although the young and romantic Nietzsche toyed with such pessimistic posturing, he was already starting to see through it in BoT. Behind the appearances of Apollonian reserve and Dionysian abandon, behind the appearance of individuality and the appearance of collectivity lay not Kant's formal noumena, nor Hegel's teleologically organized spirit of absolute revelation, nor even Schopenhauer's endless aimless striving will, but chaos, a monster of energy, a cosmic can of worms. Here's where it ends up: compare *Twilight of the Idols* "The Four Great Errors" §8 with *WLN* 11[74] p.213. Then think about the difference between what he published, what he didn't, and what that means with regard to the difference between appearance and reality, the person and the mask, and the project Nietzsche was engaged in. The tragic conflict between the imperative to appear whole and the inability to feel whole, and the impotence of thinking to understand why this is so. But its better to have both than neither.

So one the one hand Nietzsche is realizing that the unity of the romantic "true soul" of the

idealists is a figment, while on the other, the unity of the cultural renaissance was divided before it began. In the end, the drafts of *HatH* vol III (W&S) and *Parsifal* crossed each other in the mail as Wagner and Nietzsche sent them to each other, "like crossed swords" Nietzsche later wrote in a letter. Each read the other's work, and they never spoke again. The problems you point to are the growing pangs of this development - Wagner went on to his Christian phase, and Nietzsche went on to develop his theories of the will to power and the *übermensch*.

This is what BoT is becoming - a realization that Schopenhauer's Will is a "shadow of God" (*Gay Science* §108). It's not personalized but it is still the whole, and remains ultimately the same philosophy as Spinoza's, a kind of pantheism. But the great insight of Greek religion is precisely the pluralism and lack of a metaphysical unity to the gods themselves, who remain a striving, struggling agonistic bunch. This is a different answer to what art is for: not to express the ineffable wholeness of the Will, but to manifest, celebrate and explore the teeming multiplicity of will to power, not beholden to any implication that it is kind of "God". The thing about power is that it is generated through its own appearance, and in *BGE* and *GM* Nietzsche locates the genealogical origin of the will in the feeling of being obeyed. What makes a command into a command is that it is obeyed. Otherwise it's just something someone says that I hear and ignore. The obedience creates the feeling of the increase of power in the commander, and the phenomenon of that feeling of change is what we call will. Thus it is a complex social construction involving the complex networks of command and obedience in which we are all enmeshed. He does still follow Schopenhauer in identifying the body as the manifestation of the will, and that's why he ends up in *BGE* §19 saying "our body is after all only a society constructed out of many souls - *L'effet c'est moi.*" The sections from §16 up to §19 are all crucial.

For Schopenhauer, what tries to express itself symbolically in art is a mystic entity called Will which is in some sense the whole itself. For Nietzsche, what expresses itself in art is not so much the whole but the future, for which the concept of the *übermensch* is a kind of metaphor or symbol. Here's how I think of it. Imagine our simian ancestors hanging out in the trees millions of years ago. Did they hold a conference and pass a resolution on how to evolve? No, they played with their vocal chords and used them however they could and eventually language evolved. As a matter of principle they couldn't have considered vocal capacities before they acquired them, but that to one side for a moment, had the monkeys somehow magically gotten together and been able to decide how they should mutate, they no doubt would have gone for something useful like an extra hand on the end of their tail. The suggestion that an extra vocal chord or two was a good idea would no doubt have been considered a waste of a good wish.

This is Nietzsche's attack on teleology - the idea that we know what's good for us. The same point can be made by thinking of what you would have made your adult life into if, as a six-year-old, you were given three wishes by a genie - probably something like eating meals of nothing but lollies, always wearing your pyjamas, and watching 10 hours of cartoons every day - things which, if granted would eventually become a living hell. You mentioned Silenius, and before he met the young Dionysus and taught him that sombre message Schopenhauer was so fond of ("the best thing is never to have been born, the second best, to die soon"), he met King Midas and taught him a lesson, when he greedily forgot that the golden touch would make both eating and human contact impossible.

Just as the apes couldn't know what capacities their vocal chords harbored, we also cannot in principle know what undeveloped capacities we might yet discover in ourselves - Spinoza made this point too, and Nietzsche repeats it in *TSZ*. This is what art is for according to Nietzsche - our highest

form of play, in which the explicit and the implicit interact and lead thought beyond what can be reached by the merely cognitive. Art fosters and protects the ineffable that is yet somehow felt, that it may somehow grow out into reality. Into the *übermensch* which we can fathom no more than the monkey can fathom us. What do the monkey, the human and the *übermensch* all express? What reality are they the appearances of? At the stage of *BoT* Nietzsche still thinks in terms of the Will, which is the body in all its potential, just as he still thought in terms of the romantic true self behind all its appearances. Throughout the aphoristic works this self is dismantled into a psychology of the drives and a phenomenological metaphysics of becoming.

So you are quite right in thinking that this rejection of what he calls the "soul superstition" in its latest incarnation as the ego does not make him a materialist. For he turns from the dogmatic metaphysician having debunked his superstitions of other worlds and separable souls, and asks the materialist "what then is matter?" How is "matter" less a superstition than spirit was? We think we know what matter is, and once at school learnt about the little solar-system-like atoms composed of little spheres of, um, stuff. Then we got to university and learnt that electrons, protons and neutrons are made of quarks and gluons and muons and pi-bosons and neutrinos and virtual photons and strings of vibrating energy folded in ten dimensions. In short, a complex "zoo" as they call it of sub-atomic particles where there was supposed to be a bottom line of absolute simplicity.

Likewise with the body: sure, abolish the soul and be a materialist, but do you really know what a body is any more than you really know what matter is? Did the monkey's know they had vocal chords capable of evolving into the portal through which the existence of language would leap? Appearances are determined by the sensitivity of our sensory apparatus - jelly fish can't see the writing on the submarine as they float past. Fish can see it but not read it. A chimp can hear the sound of our voices, but not understand what they're saying - although it can detect tones of anger or affection. The point being that we do not know what we are unaware of, just as we are unaware of what else our bodies might be able to do. Hence *WLN* 36[35] p.27: "the body is a more astonishing idea than the old soul."

Peter Sloterdijk has an interesting reading of the *BoT* in his book *Thinker on Stage: Nietzsche's Materialism*. I don't agree with his line on Nietzsche as a postmetaphysician, any more than I agree with Heidegger's of him as the last of the metaphysicians. On my interpretation Nietzsche is trying to win back a worldly meaning for metaphysics from the superstitious understanding of the other-worldly metaphysicians of the world's religions (he says Buddhism is a more refined form of nihilism to Christianity, but still a nihilism. Judeaism he like because its not other-worldly - no heaven or hell - but the whole God thing is a hangover from slave-trauma, he thinks. Hinduism should appeal due to its multiplicity a la the ancient Greeks, but he is still suspicious of the caste system and the rule of priests.) There is more to reality than just nature (*phusis*) - there is freedom, which is paradoxically identified with *amor fati* - the love of fate and the willingness to live as if your life repeated endlessly. I think there is a metaphysics of the essentially elusive *übermensch*, the temporality of eternal return and the endless expenditure of will to power which enables an orientation we call creativity. This metaphysics meshes with a cultural agenda to overcome nihilism in the form of religion and to celebrate instead the transforming power of art and the profound importance of mythology which winds its way through *HatH*, *Dawn*, and *Gay Science* to find full expression in *TSZ*.

And finally - Nuno Nabais's *Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic* might be interesting...
Cheers, D.

Hello David,

In my last email to you, I asked a series of questions that probably appeared rather chaotic. I was wondering if you could just comment on the accuracy of a very short paragraph I've written concerning Nietzsche's use of Schopenhauer's will (I'm trying to explain why the Dionysian experience is one of violence):

Schopenhauer argues that the manifestation of the will in individuality produces incessant pain and destruction so that life consists of constant suffering and dying (Schopenhauer 560), trouble, pain, anxiety (359). He suggests that the only way to escape this suffering is through aesthetic experience, and music in particular allows one to transcend the will's objectification in individuality to intuitively feel the metaphysical will: music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but a *copy of the will itself* (259). For Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience in art, and particularly in music, leads to a pure mode of contemplation in which man is raised above all willing and all individuality. In the intuition of eternity he is freed from the every-striving and desiring will. There is no more struggle, no more pain, but merely a state of pure will-less contemplation (Pfeffer 53). That is, in returning to the will through aesthetic experience, man is freed from the suffering inherent to its manifestation in representation. Nietzsche anthropomorphizes Schopenhauer's metaphysical will using various names: the primordial being (81), the primal mother (80), the father of all things (26), and the Primordial Unity (105); it is also the ground of things (39) and identified with nature, a conflation evident in Nietzsche's description of the Apolline and its opposite, the Dionysiac, as artistic powers which erupt from nature itself (19), and his reference to the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself (17). It is the will, then, that manifests as the Apollonian and Dionysian artistic drives in man. However, while Schopenhauer views pain and suffering to be a function of the will's objectification in the body, Nietzsche views these qualities to be characteristic of the primal unity or universal will itself (Heilke 32). For Nietzsche, Dionysian experience, in intuiting the will, does not deliver one from the suffering as it does for Schopenhauer, but on the contrary unites one with, and even embraces, suffering, pain, destruction, and death.

1) I understand that Schopenhauer posits the will as the ground of the world that produces the veil of maya, of representation, and that inherent to it is pain and suffering (and boredom). Schopenhauer's conception of aesthetic experience is that which allows a release or escape from the will and the pain it causes. However, as you have said, music represents the will, or gives direct access to it. This means that for S, music does *not* produce the contemplative will-less aesthetic experience. Doesn't this mean that music is somewhat bad because it unites one with the will rather than giving one respite from it? And isn't this where Nietzsche diverges from Schopenhauer? N follows S in suggesting that music expresses elements of the will and its pain and suffering but that this is to be embraced rather than escaped from. So, is it that Nietzsche and Schopenhauer actually have quite oppositional value judgments of music? (But if this is the case, why does Schopenhauer call music the panacea of all our sorrows in 52?)

2) Is it accurate for me to think that Schopenhauer views suffering and pain to be a part of the will's manifestation (and not the will itself), while Nietzsche views these qualities to be part of the will itself? (This is what Thomas Heilke, in *Nietzsches Tragic Regime*) also suggests.

3) James Porter, in *The Invention of Dionysus*, argues that Nietzsche is rejecting Schopenhauer's concept of will as metaphysical truth altogether, saying that there is nothing behind appearances, that the will itself is only appearance. However, if my understanding (and my understanding of your notes) is correct, isn't it that Nietzsche *does* go along with Schopenhauer in positing the will as a metaphysical truth, and that Apollo and Dionysus are different representations of it, but that the point is that the will may only ever manifest as representation, appearance, differential truths? So, basically, that there *is* an absolute metaphysical truth, the will, but that it may never be known in human experience in this absolute form?

4) Schopenhauer identifies nature with the phenomenal world (52 again), so, the will's representation. However, would I be correct in reading Nietzsche as actually conflating nature and the will (as opposed to representation)? This is what is suggested in statements such as: the Apolline and its opposite, the Dionysiac, as artistic powers which erupt from nature itself (BT 19), and his discussion of the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself (BT 17). So, when Nietzsche says that in the Dionysian state, one merges fully with that original artist of the world (BT 33), that artist is an anthropomorphized will-nature figure, isn't it?

5) Would I be correct in analyzing the sentence I've just quoted as demonstrating a central tension in *The Birth of Tragedy*: that here Nietzsche is proposing a full merger / direct access to the will, but elsewhere he has stated that music never allows direct access to the will, that it is only ever (like Apollonian art) a representation or appearance of the will?

Thankyou. Romana

Soon to be answered! - D.